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INTRODUCTION
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.” –
1
John Rawls

In an age of rapid advancement in the fields of science and technology, it is
becoming increasingly important to ensure that the branches of government
responsible for crafting and evaluating laws that safeguard public interests do so in
*
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insight throughout this process, and for her model of community involvement and academic integrity. I am
also immensely grateful to the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality associates and editorial team for their
careful review of my work, for the time they spent improving this Note for publication, and for the speed with
which they did so after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. They
helped me to develop the very best version of my Note, and for that I am deeply grateful. For lifelong editorial
assistance, unparalleled support and dedication to my success in all endeavors, and for the example he sets as
a Renaissance and family man, I am forever indebted to my father, Richard von Ende. For stimulating a lifelong interest in and dedication to society's continued provision of quality health care, and for the strength and
moral compass with which she endowed me, I am profoundly grateful to my mother, Dr. Harriet Langley. For
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and Elizabeth, Matthew, and Jennifer von Ende. I am also thankful to Professor Steve Sanders for helpful
insights on earlier drafts and for research opportunities that provided continued motivation to address these
fundamental constitutional issues. For enabling my legal education, I also appreciate the financial support of
Indiana University and the many alumni who have contributed to scholarship programs and funded fellowship
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an informed, honest, and responsible manner. This is particularly true in the
sphere of women’s reproductive health. There are various areas of law in which
science and technology play an important role, including environmental law,
regulation of the Internet, criminal sentencing, intellectual property, and many
others. Both science and law are disciplines aimed at the realization of specific
values: truth and justice, respectively. The scientific method and both common
and constitutional law have institutionalized features of deliberate review in order
to achieve these goals. Likewise, both disciplines can claim credit for providing
people across the world with the capability of enjoying greater liberties as a result
of advancements in each respective field.
As important a consideration as scientific validity should be when assessing
the credibility of a law aimed at protecting women’s health, it is also critical to
discern other social facts with heightened scrutiny when making such an analysis.2
Unfortunately, abortion policymaking in the United States often fails to
contemplate these social facts—and the current statistics that implicate these facts
are staggering. World Health Organization reports indicate that women in the
United States experience some of the worst maternal3 and infant4 mortality rates of
any developed country. The National Institutes of Health issued a report
discussing the maternal death problem in the United States, explaining, “[t]he
United States has a higher ratio of maternal deaths than at least 40 other
countries, even though it spends more money per capita for maternity care than
any other.”5
The Guttmacher Institute published findings in an updated fact sheet
detailing the social facts relating to pregnancy and women who seek abortions. Of
particular relevance are the following figures: half of all pregnancies in the United
States are unintended;6 three in ten American women will obtain an abortion in
their lifetimes;7 61% of those obtaining abortions are mothers and 34% are women
2
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in
the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 16–17 (2008); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV.
261, 264–65 (1992).
3
Maternity Care in the US, AM. C. NURSE-MIDWIVES 1, http://www.midwife.org/acnm/files/cc
LibraryFiles/Filename/000000003784/MACPACAttachmentFinal1-6-14.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2015)
(the United States ranked 46th in the world in maternal mortality in 2012). Compare World Health
Org., World Health Statistics 2014, at 86 (2014) (28 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in the
United States), with id. at 90 (average of seventeen maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in high
income countries).
4
Maternity Care in the US, supra note 3, at 1 (the United States ranked 27th in the world in
infant mortality).
5
Ina May Gaskin, Maternal Death in the United States: A Problem Solved or a Problem
Ignored?, 17 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 9, 9 (2008).
6
Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (July 2015),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html.
7
Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (March 2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB_Induced_Abortion.html.
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with more than one child;8 and more laws regulating women’s reproductive health
have been passed in the 2011– 13 period than in the decade prior.9 Various national
medical associations have published policy statements or passed resolutions
demonstrating the medical profession’s disapproval of many recently enacted
reproductive health care restrictions.10 Furthermore, a USA Today/Gallup poll
from December 2012 indicates that 53% of Americans would not like to see the
Supreme Court completely overrule Roe v. Wade,11 and over half support keeping
abortion legal in all or most cases.12
In addition to the social facts implicated in this area of policymaking,
National Advocates for Pregnant Women, a policy- and litigation-focused
advocacy organization spearheaded by Lynn Paltrow, published a report detailing
an emerging trend toward the criminalization of pregnant women who engage in
certain acts.13 The report describes the forced arrest of hundreds of pregnant
women for violation of laws that were either not intended to apply to pregnant
women or based on junk science.14
An analysis of these social facts provides multiple insights. First,
reproductive health care and access to it in the U.S. are overwhelmingly
inadequate.15 Second, the anti-choice messaging around contraception, pregnancy,
and abortion is both successful16 and largely misrepresentative.17 Third, it is clear

8
Rachel K. Jones, Lawrence B. Finer & Susheela Singh, Characteristics of U.S. Abortion
Patients, 2008, GUTTMACHER INST. 3, 8 (May 2010), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/US-AbortionPatients.pdf.
9
Elizabeth Nash, Rachel Benson Gold, Andrea Rowan, Gwendolyn Rathburn & Yana
Vierboom, Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 State Policy Review, GUTTMACHER
INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2015).
10
Andrea D. Friedman, Bad Medicine: Abortion and the Battle Over for Who Speaks for
Women’s Health, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 45, 46–47 (2013).
11
Lydia Saad, Majority of Americans Still Support Roe v. Wade Decision, GALLUP (Jan. 22,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160058/majority-americans-support-roe-wade-decision.aspx.
12
Data Trends: Abortion, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/datatrend/domestic-issues/abortion/ (last updated Sept. 22, 2014); Press Release, NARAL Pro-Choice
Am., Gallup Shows Support for Legal Abortion Remains Strong (May 23, 2012),
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/press-releases/2012/pr05232012_gallup.html.
13
LYNN M. PALTROW & JEANNE FLAVIN, ARRESTS OF AND FORCED INTERVENTIONS
ON PREGNANT WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973–2005: IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S
LEGAL STATUS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 299 (2013).
14
Id.
15
Rachel Hansen & Rebecca Newman, Health Care: Access After Health Care Reform, 16 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 191, 193–94 (2015) (demonstrating that various reasons including coverage gaps, high
medical costs, poor rural health care, and burdensome reproductive health restrictions lead to
inadequate care).
16
See, e.g., ALESHA DOAN, OPPOSITION AND INTIMIDATION: THE ABORTION WARS AND STRATEGIES
OF POLITICAL HARASSMENT 4 (2007); SARAH ERDREICH, GENERATION ROE: INSIDE THE FUTURE OF THE
PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT 179 (2013).
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that state legislatures’ unscrupulous use of science and pseudoscience in crafting
laws to regulate pregnant women, and the courts’ failure to call them on their
bluff, is becoming a significant problem.18
Instead of looking at reliable, illustrative social statistics, legislatures have
relied on junk science and debunked theories in order to propose and pass
hundreds of morality-based laws regulating women’s reproductive health.19
Moreover, courts have entertained and dismissed challenges to these laws without
critically assessing the science that purportedly underpins them. These laws take
several forms20 and constitute an incremental strategy to make abortions
unavailable—even absent a reversal of Roe v. Wade.21 Targeted regulations of
abortion providers (“TRAP laws”) regulate both providers and clinics that offer
abortion services.22 Fetal protection laws (FPLs) are laws that purport to protect
the state’s interest in potential life—an interest originally recognized in Roe. 23
FPLs take multiple forms and can designate a pregnant women a criminal for her
current or previous drug use or for seeking addiction treatment. Other FPLs
impose outright bans on abortion after a specified gestational age on the faulty
premise of fetal pain. Additionally, there are informed consent laws that aim to
regulate women seeking abortion services by requiring the provision of

17
Shaniqua Seth & Malika Redmond, Billboards, Women of Color, and Politics, NAT’L
WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK
(May/June
2012),
https://nwhn.org/newsletter/node/1402
[http://web.archive.org/web/20121019185228/http://nwhn.org/newsletter/node/1402].
18
Friedman, supra note 9, at pt. 3; see also B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care
Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 501 (2009); Medical and Social Health Benefits: Since Abortion
was
Made
Legal
in
the
U.S.,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/4713/96
11/5762/Abortion_Medical_and_Social_Benefits.pdf (last updated Feb. 2014).
19
Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175 (2014).
20
Proof
of
the
GOP
War
on
Women,
POLITICUSUSA (May
13,
2011),
http://www.politicususa.com
/proof-war-women-2.
21
See, e.g., Irin Carmon, The Right’s Plan to Reverse Roe: Ban Abortions to ‘Protect’ Women,
MSNBC (Sept. 13, 2013, 8:47 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-rights-plan-reverse-roe-ban;
Amanda Marcotte & Jesse Taylor, How States Could Ban Abortion With ‘Roe’ Still Standing, NATION
(July 14, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/162033/how-states-could-ban-abortion-roe-stillstanding; Michael New, Incremental Pro-Life Legislative Success Gives Future Hope, LIFENEWS.COM
(Aug. 9, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2012/08/09/incremental-pro-life-legislativesuccess-gives-future-hope/; Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Bopp,
Coleson
&
Bostrom,
Pro-Life
Strategy
Issues
5
(Aug.
7,
2007),
http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/Bopp%20Mem
o%20re%20State%20HLA.pdf.
22
State Laws Regulating Reproductive Rights, LAW STUDENTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE,
http://lsrj.org/documents/factsheets/13_State_Laws_Regulating_Repro_Rights.pdf (last updated
Aug. 2013).
23
Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional
Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 781, 787 (2014); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973).
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unnecessary procedures like ultrasounds, counseling, and compulsory waiting
periods.
The medical community largely opposes these morality-driven laws, as
evidenced by the various amicus curiae filings, legislative testimonies, and
publications provided by representatives of national medical organizations.24
Furthermore, the validity of the claim that these laws are passed in order to
promote the State’s interest in women’s health has been called into question by
various statements made to reporters or documented in legislative records.25 The
effect of these laws on women’s access to reproductive health services is significant
and disproportionately impacts poor women, rural women, and women of color.26
This Note first establishes the current trend of legislatures’ unscrupulous
use of science in regulating women’s health and discusses the impact of these laws
on individual choice, societal values and interests, and national reproductive
health. This Note then examines the potential implications of a continued trend
and proposes several possible ways of addressing this problem.
Part I of this Note documents the role of the federal courts in establishing a
legal framework that permits the passage of onerous and medically unnecessary
restrictions by state governments. Part II explores the various types of laws that
have been enacted and their misleading justifications, specifically those regulating
women’s reproductive health under the guise of protecting the State’s interest in
the health of the mother and the fetus. Part II.B.i profiles TRAP laws, Part II.B.ii
summarizes the criminalization of substance abuse by pregnant women, Part
II.B.iii outlines the proliferation of fetal pain abortion bans, and Part II.B.iv reviews
the several variations of informed consent laws. Analyses of these restrictions will
illustrate the inaccuracy of their purported scientific underpinnings and the
continuing opposition by medical and legal communities. Part III briefly discusses
the potential technologies that may be implicated in a continued trend of
legislatures basing health care restrictions on faulty science. Finally, Part IV
proposes recommendations for how courts and activists can reverse this trend,
24
E.g., Steven E. Weinberger, Hal C. Lawrence, III, Douglas E. Henley, Errol R. Alden, &
David B. Hoyt, Legislative Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship, NEW ENG. J. MED,
July–Dec. 2012, at 1557, 1557–59; Leading Medical Groups Oppose Obstacles to Abortion, NARAL PROCHOICE
A M.
(July
10,
2002),
https://web.archive.org/web/20060117003817/http://www.naral.org/facts/loader.cfm
?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=1715; Policy Statement, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, Abortion Policy (Nov. 2014), http://acog.org/-/media/Statements-ofPolicy/Public/sop069.pdf?la=en. The laws are also opposed by medical sociologists. E.g., Policy
Statement, Soc’y for Med. Anthropology (July 2014), http://www.medanthro.net/demo/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/CAR-PS.pdf.
25
See, e.g., Tara Culp-Ressler, Mississippi Governor: ‘My Goal of Course is to Shut Down’ the
State’s
Last
Abortion
Clinic,
THINKPROGRESS
(Jan.
11,
2013,
10:55
AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/
2013/01/11/1434991/mississippi-governor-shut-down-clinic/.
26
Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women, 11
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 15, 16–17 (1989).
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suggesting three separate and complementary approaches: 1) decreased deference
to legislative fact-finding, 2) the recognition of an implicit right to medical
decision making, and 3) increased focus by pro-choice groups and progressive
news outlets on reporting these problems and successful messaging campaigns
around reproductive health as a political issue.

I.

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN RECOGNIZING WOMEN’S
INTEREST IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
“I don’t think the law exists to arrive at the truth. . . . There's an enormous
difference between the role of truth in law and the role of truth in science. In law,
27
truth is one among many goals.” – Alan Dershowitz

A.

In Search of a Workable Doctrine
A woman’s right to an abortion is supported by several constitutional
theories; for example, due process privacy rights, the Equal Protection clause,28
and the Ninth Amendment29 have been asserted by academics, litigators, and
Supreme Court Justices alike.30 The current social, legal, and political climate
surrounding access to reproductive health services has been shaped by centuries of
traditional cultural practices and social transformations, and, more recently, by
rights movements and evolving legal doctrine.

27
Kathryn Schulz, Alan Dershowitz on Being Wrong, Part II: Error in the Law, SLATE (May 12,
2010, 5:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/thewrongstuff/2010/05/12/alan_dershowitz_on_being_
wrong_part_ii_error_in_the_law.html.
28
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 375–76 (1985).
29
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 210–11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
30
In this author’s opinion, however, abortion jurisprudence is properly situated within the
broader jurisprudential field addressing the right to medical decision-making, implicitly protected
by the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. This domain of law addresses
end of life care, informed consent requirements, competence and capacity requirements in medical
decision-making by minors, and the prescription and use of medicinal marijuana. Within this field
of law, two doctrines have emerged, one that elevates autonomy and self-determination as primary
values and another that defers to the state interest in protecting public health. B. Jessie Hill, The
Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV
277, 294–295 (2007).
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B.

Pre-Roe
Historians and legal scholars recognize that women have engaged in
abortion procedures across different cultures for centuries.31 However, it was only
beginning in the 1800s that laws across the United States began to criminalize this
act.32 The history of U.S. common law demonstrates that the fetus was not
considered the equivalent of a person.33 In adjudicating disputes around individual
actions that unintentionally destroyed a fetus, whether the fetus had quickened
was a dispositive factor in assessing the extent of the harm imposed; specifically, in
determining whether the loss of the child would be treated as a homicide or as a
civil damage for which compensation would suffice.34
Initially, it was the organized medical profession that led the effort to
criminalize abortion.35 Some historical accounts attribute the criminalization of
abortion to a backlash that developed among medical professionals, state
authorities, and the public in hopes of tightening control over women and in
response to societal changes brought about by suffrage, birth control, and the use
of midwives.36 Regardless of the impetus for criminalization, it is clear that
lawyers, physicians, and public health officials were instrumental in reshaping
public policy to avoid the life-threatening trend of illegal and unsafe abortions.37
Activists, scholars, and professionals played key roles in setting the stage for a
monumental Supreme Court decision that would finally provide protections for
the important personal and state interests at stake in making abortions legal and
accessible.

31
E.g., Rochelle N. Shain, A Cross-Cultural History of Abortion, 13 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
CLINICS N. AM. 1, 1 (1986); Medical and Social Health Benefits: Since Abortion Was Made Legal in the
U.S.,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD
1,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/4713/9611/5762/Abortion_M
edical_and_Social_Benefits.pdf (last updated Feb. 2014) (noting that over 200,000 abortions were
performed in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s); Timeline, 4000 YEARS FOR CHOICE,
http://www.4000yearsforchoice.com/pages/timeline [https://web.archive.org/web/20140318233559/
http://www.4000yearsforchoice.com/pages/timeline].
32
Katha
Pollitt,
Abortion
in
American
History,
ATLANTIC
(May
1997),
http://www.theatlantic.co
m/magazine/archive/1997/05/abortion-in-american-history/376851/.
33
Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (recognizing that the law has never treated fetuses as whole persons).
34
LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 1867–1973, at 8–13 (1997); see also Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing
Protection for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 519
n.306 (2009).
35
LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE 3 (2012), http://documents.law.ya
le.edu/sites/default/files/BeforeRoe2ndEd_1.pdf.
36
History of Abortion in the U.S., OUR BODIES OURSELVES (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.ourbodies
ourselves.org/health-info/u-s-abortion-history/.
37
GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 34, at 3–4.
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C.

Recognizing a Fundamental Right: Roe v. Wade
The right to an abortion, first recognized in the 1973 decision Roe v. Wade, 38
has evolved since the interests at play were first pronounced in that historic ruling.
The majority opinion in Roe situated abortion within the context of the (then
relatively recent) expansion of due process liberty doctrine. The Court declared
that the right earlier outlined in Griswold v. Connecticut,39 and subsequently
understood as a right of privacy encompassed in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”40
Roe articulated a legal balancing test to weigh the three conflicting interests
that must be considered when determining which regulations of abortions are
permissible and when. First, the State recognized a woman’s interest in privacy
and self-determination.41 The Roe Court also recognized the interest of the State in
protecting women’s health and the additional interest of the State in protecting
potential life.42
The Court theorized that these interests could be weighed differently as a
pregnancy progresses.43 The majority opinion proposed a trimester framework that
recognized that first trimester abortions are safer than childbirth and left decisions
about abortion in the first trimester up to the woman and her doctor.44 The
trimester framework only permitted those restrictions in the second trimester that
had the effect of protecting women’s health.45 The framework allowed bans on
abortions after the third trimester—the time at which the feature of viability
typically emerges in the fetus—if exceptions were made for the health of the
mother.46 Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Roe also pinpointed the Ninth
Amendment’s reservation of additional rights to the people as potential bases for
this outcome. Roe was a monumental decision because it recognized abortion as a
fundamental right, deserving of strict scrutiny in the courts.47
D.

Continued Challenges
The Supreme Court overturned several laws from 1973 through 1992 that
attempted to regulate women’s access to abortion. With only three major
exceptions in rejecting dozens of laws, the Court enforced the Roe ruling that previability regulations would survive strict scrutiny only if they served to protect the
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

410 U.S. at 154.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 163–64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167–71 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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health of the mother. In the 1979 case Bellotti v. Baird, the Court upheld a
Massachusetts state law requiring a minor to obtain parental consent or to
persuade a judge of her maturity before obtaining an abortion.48 In the 1980 Harris
v. McRae decision, the Court held that Medicaid was not required to cover
medically necessary abortions, despite being an otherwise comprehensive health
coverage plan.49
The Court’s 1989 ruling in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services upheld a
Missouri statute that prohibited public health workers or public facilities from
participating in abortion procedures when unnecessary to save the life of the
mother, prohibited counseling or other encouragement to obtain an abortion, and
required physicians to perform viability tests for women who were beyond their
nineteenth week of pregnancy.50 In a 5-4 decision, the Court found the Missouri
statute constitutional, overturning lower court decisions that had struck the
statute down. In yet another placating move, which professed deference in name
only, the Court claimed to hold to the fundamental portions essential to the
original holding in Roe. The Court proclaimed that the preamble to the restrictions
in the statute, which asserted that life begins at conception, did not functionally
affect the law or restrict abortion, that there was no affirmative right requiring
states to enter the business of abortion, and that the viability test served the State’s
recognized interest in protecting potential life.
E.

The Liberty Interest and Undue Burden Test: An Evolving Standard
Although the Court has continued to uphold the heart of the Roe holding
(recognition and protection of women’s interest in and ability to obtain abortions),
the constitutional protection was most greatly weakened by the Court’s 1992 ruling
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.51 This case involved a
challenge to an expansive abortion law passed in Pennsylvania with provisions that
mandated informed consent, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and both parental
consent (in the case of a minor) and spousal notification (with waiver options
available for mitigating circumstances).52 A joint concurrence issued by the Court’s
centrist justices and the Court’s conservative justices affirmed the principle that
pre-viability abortions could not be banned but upheld all of the challenged
provisions except the spousal notification requirement.53
The Casey decision altered the standard of review set out by Roe and largely
revised the trimester framework, dismantling the general protection for first
trimester abortions against regulation and newly permitting any regulation that
48
49
50
51
52
53

443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979).
448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980).
492 U.S. 490, 499–501 (1989).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 844.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
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does not have the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”54 Most importantly, Casey
established a new standard for evaluating whether regulations unconstitutionally
interfered with this protected liberty interest. The Court asserted that any
regulation that imposes a substantial obstacle, thereby constraining a woman from
obtaining a legal abortion, is considered an “undue burden,” which violates the
constitutional right of women to obtain abortions.55 The ruling in Casey, however,
upheld Roe’s reasoning, which declared that a woman’s decision to obtain an
abortion implicates liberty interests that are protected from State interference by
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.56
Casey was an impactful decision that functioned to placate activists who
were nervous about the sustained legality of abortion under the law. The Court’s
transformative holding in Casey created a malleable and vague standard,
permitting increasing numbers of state regulations, the constitutionality of which
is constantly being drawn into question. Unfortunately, as Andrea Friedman, the
director of the National Partnership for Women and Families, explained of Casey,
[T]he Court [gave] little actual guidance as to how this standard was to be applied.
This ambiguity of the standard became even clearer as lower courts attempted to
put it into effect. The plurality of the Court in Casey found that the provision of
“truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the abortion procedure,
the attendant health risks and those of childbirth” was consistent with “Roe’s
57
acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life . . . .”

As a result, Caitlin Borgmann explains,
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court explicitly sanctioned the state's reliance
on morality as the basis for abortion regulation. Yet the decision, which upheld a
woman's right to abortion, placed limits on how the state could express or
implement its preference for childbirth. Accepting Casey's invitation, legislatures
have enacted a wide variety of restrictions based on moral opposition to abortion.
But, partly in response to the confusing legal standard set forth in Casey, they have
58
felt compelled to disguise these moral viewpoints as scientific fact.

In 2000, the Supreme Court accepted the State’s appeal of a Nebraska
statute that had been overturned by lower courts as in contravention of the undue
burden standard.59 The statute banned partial-birth abortions (a term that is
functionally meaningless and was used as an anti-choice messaging technique) and

54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 877.
See id. at 874.
Id. at 853, 871, 874.
Friedman, supra note 9, at 50 (emphasis omitted).
Borgmann, supra note 2, at 16.
Sternberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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forbade a particular abortion procedure known as Dilation and Extraction (D&E).60
The Supreme Court rejected the statute in a 5-4 ruling that was closer than many
expected, with Justice Kennedy siding with the dissent and differentiating between
this restriction and others based on moral questions that the procedure raised.61
Only seven years later, in 2007, the Supreme Court accepted a case for
review that challenged the newly-passed Partial Birth Abortion Ban,62 which had
been sponsored by the Bush Administration. Gonzales v. Carhart63 was a startling
5-4 decision that likely reflected the changing makeup of the Court more than any
substantial difference between the federal law and the overturned Nebraska
statute, as Justice Samuel Alito had replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on the
Court. The Court upheld the federal law, giving great deference to the legislative
fact-finding process and not questioning the scientific underpinnings of bases for
the law.64 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent decried the Court’s decision, noting, among
other criticisms, that the ruling represented the first time the Court had upheld a
restriction that did not provide an explicit exemption for the health of the
mother.65 Most disturbingly, Kennedy’s majority opinion articulated that, “[t]he
Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in
areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty,”66 fostering an
environment in which shoddy science could be used to create an inappropriate
impression or scientific uncertainty and to make room for laws with illegitimate
scientific bases.67
F.

Current State of the Law
In current doctrine, the law is still bound by the undue burden standard. In
reality, the state of the law is in confusion regarding the proper application of this
standard. For example, the Supreme Court has employed the standard in
upholding mandatory seventy-two hour delays and in rejecting spousal
notification requirements, while both rejecting and upholding laws banning

60
Id. at 921–22.
61
Id. at 946, 956–79.
62
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
63
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
64
Id. at 165–66, 168.
65
Id. at 169–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66
Id. at 163.
67
Cf., e.g., Ames Grawert, The Fundamental Meaning of “Medical Uncertainty”: Judicial
Deference to Selective Science in Gonzales v. Carhart, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 379 (2009);
Sharona Coutts & Sofia Resnick, How Shoddy Evidence Finds Its Way from State Legislatures to the
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
RH
REALITY
CHECK
(Nov.
13,
2014,
11:56
AM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/201
4/11/13/shoddy-evidence-finds-way-state-legislatures-u-s-supreme-court/.
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dilation and extraction procedures without any explicit exception for emergency
circumstances which require the procedure in the interest of women’s health.68
The change in standard of review that resulted from the Casey ruling, from
fundamental right deserving of strict scrutiny to an undue burden standard,
remains troublingly unclear and has been applied differently by state and federal
courts.69 Gonzales’ application of the new Casey standard to the interests
articulated in Roe opened the door for legislatures to craft laws regulating
pregnant women under the guise of protecting women’s health.

II.

THE LEGISLATIVE TREND OF UNSCRUPULOUS USE OF SCIENCE IN
CRAFTING REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH REGULATIONS
“There is no crueler tyranny than that which is perpetuated under the shield of law
and in the name of justice.” – Charles de Montesquieu

The evolving framework and standard set by Roe and Casey opened the
door for legislatures to craft morality laws and claim a valid medical basis and
interest in the protection of women’s health and fetal health.70 The propagation of
bad or questionable science and debunked theories by politicians and advocates is
referred to as the use of “junk science.”71 This Part will profile the four broad
categories of abortion laws passed by legislatures, the specific forms these laws
take and the purported scientific bases for them, and the criticisms leveled at such
laws by the medical and legal communities.
A.

Evidence of a Trend
A startling trend has emerged in state legislatures since the Supreme Court
ruled on Gonzales v. Carhart in 2007. The Gonzales decision signaled to anti68
See generally The Undue Burden Standard: Abortion Jurisprudence After Casey, CTR. FOR
REPROD. RTS. (Mar. 22, 2013), http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/the-undue-burdenmodule-updated-spring-2013 (compiling several academic articles describing the confusion with
the current state of abortion law).
69
See Jeffrey Toobin, The Disappearing “Undue Burden” Standard for Abortion Rights, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/disappearing-undueburden-standard-abortion-rights.
70
See Ed Kilgore, The Inevitable SCOTUS Review of State Abortion Laws, WASHINGTON
MONTHLY (July 10, 2013 3:11 PM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animala/2013_07/the_inevitable_scotus_review_o045750.php.
71
Lisa M. Corrigan, Navigating the Junk Science of Fetal Pain, SCIENCE PROGRESS (Apr. 29,
2013), http://scienceprogress.org/2013/04/navigating-the-junk-science-of-fetal-pain/; see also
Jessica Mason Pieklo, Excuse Me? There’s No ‘Unsettled Science’ in the Contraception Challenges, RH
REALITY CHECK (Mar. 12, 2014 4:14 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/03/12/excuse-theresunsettled-science-contraception-challenges/.
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choice activists and legislators that abortion and other reproductive health
regulations would receive significantly less scrutiny under the new Roberts Court’s
application of the undue burden standard.72 As a result, since Republicans swept
into state legislatures in 2010, a staggering number of regulations targeting
pregnant women and choice have been proposed and passed in the states.73 These
restrictions are smarter74 and stealthier in effectively diminishing access to
abortion services, typically claiming the protection of women’s health or fetal
health as the basis for the imposition of extensive restrictions on women and
providers.75 The difficulty of challenging these restrictions in the courts has
emboldened state legislatures to enact more regulations between 2011 and 2013
than in the entire previous decade. Astonishingly, 300 bills were introduced in
state legislatures in 2012 alone,76 and the trend seems poised to continue.77
B.

Types of Laws Regulating Reproductive Health
Reproductive health care restrictions take multiple forms78—ranging from
mandatory delays to outright bans—and regulate everyone from health care
providers, to women seeking abortions, and even encompass women who want to
carry their pregnancies to term. These restrictions result in decreased access to
reproductive health care that has left women, families, and health care providers in
the crosshairs.

72
See Symposium, After Gonzales v. Carhart: The Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 14, 2007), http://www.pewforum.org/2007/06/14/after-gonzales-v-carhart-the-future-ofabortion-jurisprudence/.
73
See State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2015).
74
Amanda Marcotte, The Anti-Abortion Laws Are Getting Smarter, SLATE (July 9, 2014 2:07
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/07/09/guttmacher_institute_report_on_abortion_restri
ctions_trap_laws_are_super.html.
75
E.g., Beth Jordan & Elisa S. Wells, A 21st-Century Trojan Horse: The “Abortion Harms
Women” Anti-Choice Argument Disguises a Harmful Movement, 79 CONTRACEPTION 161 (2009).
76
Von Diaz, TRAP Laws are the New Battleground for Abortion Rights, COLORLINES.COM (Nov.
5,
2013
6:14
PM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/11/trap_laws_are_the_new_battleground_for_a
bortion_rights.html; Hannah Groch-Begley, 5 Facts Media Should Know About States’
Unprecedented Restrictions on Abortion, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (July 5, 2013, 10:52 AM),
http://mediamatters.org/re
search/2013/07/05/5-facts-media-should-know-about-states-unpreced/194730.
77
See Monthly States Update: Major Developments in 2014, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 2014),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/december.html.
78
The GOP Takes Its War on Women to the States, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY,
http://www.pfaw.org/media-center/publications/gop-takes-its-war-women-states (last visited Oct.
3, 2015).
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i.
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP)
One of the most successful forms of these new regulations are TRAP laws—
laws that impose restrictions on providers and on clinics as physical spaces. These
laws create “requirements that are different and more burdensome than those
imposed on other medical practices.”79 They are enacted “under the guise of
protecting women’s health,”80 on the implied and faulty premise that abortion is
an inherently dangerous procedure. In reality, abortion is one of the safest surgical
procedures in the United States and is fourteen times safer than childbirth.81
Reproductive rights groups and progressive news outlets (joined in their
opposition to these laws by leading groups of medical professionals82) have
documented the proliferation and impact of these onerous restrictions. Pro-choice
organizations, with the support of leading groups of medical professionals such as
the American Medical Association (AMA) and American Congress of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG),83 have challenged these restrictions in court claiming
that such excessive regulations are representative of abortion exceptionalism and
are medically unnecessary when abortion is actually a very safe procedure—84 safer
even than colonoscopies85 and penicillin shots!86

79
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap.
80
Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion
Clinics—and the Women they Serve—Pay the Price, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Spring 2013, at 7.
81
Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced
Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS 215, 217 (2012);
Genevra Pittman, Abortion Safer Than Giving Birth: Study, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2012 5:16 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/2012/01/23/us-abortion-idUSTRE80M2BS20120123.
82
Leading Medical Groups Oppose Obstacles to Abortion, supra note 23.
83
Ob-Gyns Denounce Texas Abortion Legislation, AM. CONG. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS
(July 2, 2013), http://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/News-Room/News-Releases/2013/Ob-GynsDenounce-Texas-Abortion-Legislation. The ACOG is closely associated with the American College
of Obstetrics and Gynecology with both sharing administrative teams. As such, throughout this
Note, the former title will be used to identify these organizations.
84
Gold & Nash, supra note 79, at 7.
85
Sasha Collins, Map: Abortion in the South: Using Admitting Privileges to Restrict Safe and
Legal
Access,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD
(May
21,
2014
2:14
PM),
http://plannedparenthoodaction.org/ele
ctions-politics/blog/latest-tactic-restrict-safe-and-legal-abortion-admitting-privileges/; Tara CulpRessler, You’re 40 Times More Likely To Die From A Colonoscopy Than from an Abortion, THINK
PROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2014 12:57 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/08/08/3469232/abortionsafety-trap-laws/.
86
Emily Bazelon, Caught in a TRAP, SLATE (May 26, 2014 11:45 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/alabama_abortion_law_ac
cess_to_abortion_through_the_entire_south_is_on_trial.html; Imani Gandy, Why Admitting
Privileges Have No Benefit, RH REALITY CHECK
(July
24, 2013
3:30
PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/07/24/why-admitting-privileges-laws-have-no-medical-benefit.
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As of December 2014, TRAP laws exist in twenty-six states,87 imposing a
variety of restrictions with which it is difficult to comply. For those providers and
clinics that manage compliance, additional administrative and renovation or
relocation expenses drive up the cost of abortion services.88 Unfortunately, this is
not the worst-case scenario. TRAP laws contributed to the closing of fifty-four
clinics from 2011 to 2013.89 Six states, as of December 2015, were down to one public
clinic still offering abortions,90 forcing state residents to travel far out of their way
in order to access reproductive health services. These laws also have the potential
deleterious effect of deterring would-be providers due to fear of criminal and civil
liability, burdensome administrative requirements, and hostile practice
environments.91
Although it has traditionally been difficult to challenge these regulations in
92
court, a recent ruling by a Wisconsin federal judge provides reason for hope and
an example of proper judicial treatment of such restrictions. The opinion, which
struck down a law involving a number of TRAP law provisions, held that the
restrictions impose a substantial obstacle and do not even bear a rational
relationship to the State’s expressed interest, as illustrated by the State’s inaction
in otherwise regulating similar medical procedures.93
Among the laws that regulate physical clinic facilities are facility-licensing
requirements necessitating that clinics obtain state licensing (a restriction not
imposed on other comparable offices or clinics) and require that clinics meet
standards relating to physical construction, staffing, and procedures.94 At times,
these licensing schemes necessitate that clinics providing surgical abortions be
87
Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts
Providers—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2014, at
9, 10.
88
Dawn Johnsen, “TRAP”ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground Alternative, 118 Yale
L.J. 1356, 1362 (2009); cf. Diaz, supra note 75.
89
Laura Bassett, Anti-Abortion Laws Take Dramatic Toll on Clinics Nationwide, Huffington
Post (Aug. 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/26/abortion-clinicclosures_n_3804529.html.
90
Robin Marty, ‘Women Will Still Find A Way’: A Look Inside Missouri’s Last Abortion Clinic,
THINK
PROGRESS
(Jan.
22,
2014,
9:45
AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/01/22/3188321/missou
ri-abortion-clinic-interview/; Austin Ruse, Missouri Joins Five States with Only One Abortion Clinic,
BREITBART (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/03/25/Missouri-JoinsFive-States-with-Only-One-Abortion-Clinic.
91
See, e.g., Tara Culp-Ressler, Doctors’ Group Slams Anti-Abortion Laws for ‘Imposing a
Political Agenda on Medical Practice’, THINK PROGRESS (June 10, 2013 2:45 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/06/10/2129831/doctors-group-anti-abortion-political-agenda/
(noting shortage of women’s health care providers in states with restrictions); Targeted Regulation
of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws: Decreasing Access, Driving Providers Away, NARAL PRO-CHOICE
AM. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-access-trap.pdf.
92
The GOP Takes Its War on Women to the States, supra note 77.
93
See Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 866 (2013).
94
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), supra note 78.
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licensed as ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs), a designation otherwise reserved
for facilities that offer a range of (typically riskier95) outpatient surgeries.96 In order
to obtain licensing, clinics are required to meet various standards. Among these
standards are specified sizes of procedure rooms, minimum corridor widths,
maximum set distances from a hospital, and transfer agreements with local
hospitals.97 In addition to these regulations, certain states require that abortions
be performed in a hospital after the fetus has reached a specified gestational age
(typically at a point during the second trimester).98 These restrictions encroach on
clinics by requiring burdensome reporting requirements and licensing agreements
that permit state inspection at any time,99 a feature of unnecessary oversight that
can significantly interfere with the quality of care and the privacy and
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship.100
In addition to regulations governing clinics, TRAP laws also impose
unnecessary and burdensome requirements on the abortion providers, intruding
significantly into providers’ ability to practice medicine and effectively
discouraging health care professionals from becoming or remaining abortion
providers.101 Restrictions on providers take various forms. In thirteen states, as of
December 2014, abortion providers are required to have some affiliation with a
local hospital, with four states requiring that providers have hospital privileges and
nine permitting an alternative agreement.102 Thirty-nine states require medication
abortions to be performed by a licensed physician, with eleven states “bann[ing]
the use of telemedicine . . . by requiring the physician to be present” in the room.103
Four states require that medication providers follow outdated FDA protocols from
2000.104 Additionally, thirty-nine states require abortions be performed by a
physician and eighteen states “require the involvement of a second physician after
a specified point in the pregnancy.”105
As legal and medical experts have argued, there is no basis to require
admitting privileges or transfer agreements in the case of an emergency when local
95
See supra text accompanying notes 82–85.
96
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), supra note 78. Twenty-two states
require such onerous standards. State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf (last updated
Aug. 1, 2015).
97
State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 95.
98
State Laws Regulating Reproductive Rights, supra note 21.
99
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers: Avoiding the “TRAP”, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. 2
(Aug. 2003), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_bp_avoid
ingthetrap.pdf.
100
See Carole Joffe, The Hidden Costs of Abortion Restrictions, RH REALITY CHECK (Oct. 15,
2014, 12:57 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/10/15/hidden-costs-abortion-restrictions/.
101
See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers: Avoiding the “TRAP”, supra note 98, at 1.
102
State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 95.
103
State Laws Regulating Reproductive Rights, supra note 21.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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emergency rooms are already required to take patients in dire medical
conditions.106 It is also an uncharacteristic regulation of the medical and
pharmaceutical professions to require providers and prescribers to follow outdated
protocols when new uses and dosages for drugs are prescribed and updated
throughout the profession with great regularity.107
ii.
Laws Criminalizing Substance Abuse by Pregnant Women
A recent report, co-authored by Lynn Paltrow and Jeanette Flavin,
documented hundreds of incidents of arrests of pregnant women.108 This troubling
trend stayed largely out of the public eye109 until the publication of the report. The
subsequent media coverage110 was followed by messaging campaigns over the next
few years.
Most of these cases have arisen through clever prosecutorial charges out of
the enforcement of statutes not originally designed to apply to pregnant women.111
However, attempts to pass personhood legislation in various states—that is,
constitutional amendments that recognize the life of a fetus as a person under the
law with the intended effect of holding anyone (including mothers) criminally
liable for harm to the fetus—would enshrine these despicable prosecutorial
maneuvers in the law once and for all.112 Fortunately, these bills have been
unsuccessful thus far,113 but they certainly represent a sign of additional legislation
that is sure to come.
106
ACOG and AMA File Amicus Brief in Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, AM. CONGRESS
OBSTETRICIANS
&
GYNECOLOGISTS
(Dec.
20,
2013),
http://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/News_Room/N
ews_Releases/2013/ACOG_and_AMA_File_Amicus_Brief.
107
Jessica Mason Pieklo, Lawsuit: Oklahoma’s Medication Abortion Restriction Is
Unconstitutional, RH REALITY CHECK (Oct. 1, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/
article/2014/10/01/lawsuit-oklahomas-medication-abortion-restriction-unconstitutional/;
Jessica
Mason Pieklo, Medical Groups File Brief with Ninth Circuit Against Arizona Medication Abortion
Restrictions,
RH
REALITY
CHECK
(Apr.
24,
2014,
2:27
PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/04/24
/medical-groups-file-brief-ninth-circuit-arizona-medication-abortion-restrictions/.
108
Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 12.
109
But cf. Punishing Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Sept.
2000), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_bp_punishingwomen.pdf
(describing the attention paid to this trend within the judicial system).
110
E.g., Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanette Flavin, Opinion, Pregnant, and No Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/opinion/pregnant-and-no-civil-rights.html.
111
See Cynthia Dailard & Elizabeth Nash, State Responses to Substance Abuse Among Pregnant
Women, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Dec. 2000, at 3.
112
See Lynn M. Paltrow, Roe v. Wade and the New Jane Crow: Reproductive Rights in the Age of
Mass Incarceration, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 17 (2013).
113
E.g., Laura Bassett, Colorado and North Dakota Voters Reject Fetal Personhood Measures,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/04/personhoodcolorado_n_6104120.html.
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Recently, Tennessee earned the unenviable distinction of being the first
state to pass a bill criminalizing drug use by pregnant women.114 Representative
and specialty medical associations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics,
the American Public Health Association, the AMA, and the ACOG, among many
others, opposed this with near uniformity and for a variety of reasons.115 In July
2014, Mallory Loyola was the first woman arrested under the new law.116
The Tennessee law, passed in April 2014, is likely rooted in the hysteria
surrounding the myth of “crack babies.” The term “crack babies” refers to infants
who are born suffering from drug dependency as a result of the mother’s use of
those drugs during pregnancy. In the 1980s and 1990s, when drug use and
increased policing and criminalization of drug users grew exponentially, news
outlets printed news pieces documenting a troubling phenomenon of babies who
were being born with symptoms of addiction.117 Unfortunately, these reports were
circulated before the long-term effects of the drugs on the babies had been studied
and measured. As it turned out, there were no significant long-term effects
causally connected to the ingestion of drugs by the fetus while in utero.118 A
decades-long study debunking the myth of the crack baby has since been
published, with high profile news outlets reporting on the new state of medical
knowledge in this area.119 Regrettably, the misinformation persists.120
114
E.g., Rebecca Terrell, Tennessee 1st State to Criminalize Pregnancy Outcomes, HEALTHY &
FREE TENN. (Apr. 29, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://healthyandfreetn.org/news/tennessee_criminalizes_preg
nancy_outcomes; cf. Alabama’s War on Women: New Ruling Criminalizes Pregnancy, Threatens to
Prosecute Women Who Have Abortions, PUBLICHEALTHWATCH (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://publichealthwa
tch.wordpress.com/2014/04/24/alabamas-war-on-women-new-ruling-criminalizes-pregnancy-threa
tens-to-prosecute-women-who-have-abortions/ (explaining how Alabama’s similar policy went into
effect through Judicial ruling).
115
E.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Tenn. Governor Singles Out Pregnant
Women for Discrimination (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/news/tenn-governor-singles-outpregnant-women-discrimination.
116
Nina Liss-Schultz, First Woman Arrested Under Tennessee Pregnancy Criminalization Law,
for a Drug Not Covered Under the Law, RH REALITY CHECK (July 10, 2014, 4:36 PM),
http://rhrealitychec
k.org/article/2014/07/10/first-woman-arrested-tennessee-pregnancy-criminalization-law-drug-cove
red-law/.
117
E.g., Clay Dillow, How Science Got the ‘Crack Baby’ Epidemic So Wrong, POPULAR SCI. (May
20, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-05/crack-baby-epidemic-never-happened.
118
Id. Although there are psychological impacts measured in attachment studies, it is unclear
whether these are tied to the ingestion of drugs by the fetus or by the household dynamic into
which the child is born. Diana Kronstadt, Complex Developmental Issues of Prenatal Drug Exposure,
FUTURE CHILD., Spring 1991, at 36.
119
E.g., Susan FitzGerald, ‘Crack Baby’ Study Ends with Unexpected but Clear Result, PHILA.
INQUIRER (July 22, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-22/news/40709969_1_hallam-hurt-socalled-crack-babies-funded-study.
120
The persistence is like that of the singular, flaw-ridden study that linked vaccinations of
children to autism. Compare Nathan Seppa, Journal Retracts Flawed Study Linking MMR Vaccine
and Autism, SCI. NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010, 4:27 PM), https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/deleted-
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Although Tennessee is the first state to impose criminal punishment for
women convicted of using drugs while pregnant, eighteen other states characterize
drug use during pregnancy as a form of child abuse under child welfare statutes,
enabling that information to be used in state custody proceedings, and three states
allow for the civil commitment of pregnant women who are discovered to have
used illicit substances during pregnancy.121
These laws harm women and the fetuses that they seek to carry to term. In
policy statements and amicus curiae, opposition by several medical groups and
associations characterizes the laws as detrimental for several reasons.122 First and
foremost, the laws interfere with addiction treatment programs that utilize
methadone or other controlled substances to wean addicted mothers off
potentially more harmful drugs.123 Additionally, the laws create a conflict of
interest for the doctor, who is forced into a choice between whether to prioritize
the treatment of the woman as patient or the fetus.124 This potentially deters
women from seeking addiction therapies, prompting women to take one of two
alternative and inferior routes: attempt to self-help and experience withdrawal
symptoms that could cause worse harm to the fetus, or continue the use of drugs
and drug-seeking behaviors that are likely detrimental to the health of the mother
and the fetus.125 The laws also disrupt the trust that is integral to a healthy
physician-patient relationship126 and heap unfair suspicion on any woman who
miscarries or experiences a stillbirth. Furthermore, the prevailing consensus
among medical groups is that certain aspects of incarceration can be dangerous for
pregnant women.127
scenes/journal-retracts-flawed-study-linking-mmr-vaccine-and-autism (explaining that the sole
study linking vaccines with autism has since been retracted), with Immunization: MMR Vaccine &
Autism, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, http://www2.aap.org/immunization/families/mmr.html (last
updated Apr. 29, 2014) (warning that the MMR vaccine has been linked to autism).
121
See Pregnant, Drug-Using Women, & State Child Welfare Policies, NAT’L ADVOC. FOR
PREGNANT WOMEN (Mar. 21, 2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/in_the_states/pre
gnant_drugusing_women_state_child_welfare_policies.php.
122
E.g., Brief for the Southern Poverty Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, In re State of Alabama v. Amanda Helaine Kimbrough, No. 11-10219, at 2–3 (Ala. Mar.
2012).
123
Women who are already enrolled in treatment have an affirmative defense to the law
however. Tennessee Pregnancy Criminalization Law (SB 1391), RH REALITY CHECK,
http://data.rhrealitycheck.org/law/tennessee-pregnancy-criminalization-law-sb-1391/ (last updated
Oct. 1, 2014).
124
See Kylie Alexandra, The Criminalization of Pregnant Women and the Illusion of MaternalFetal Conflict, 8 HOHONU 39, 41 (2010).
125
Lauren Kirchner, The Dangers of Criminalizing Pregnancy Outcomes, PAC. STANDARD (May
13, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/dangers-criminalizing-pregnancyoutcomes-81289/.
126
Culp-Ressler, supra note 90 (noting shortage of women’s health care providers in states
with restrictions).
127
See Audrey Quinn, Opinion, In Labor, in Chains, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2014), http://www.nyti
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iii.
Fetal Pain Abortion Bans
Even though only 12.5% of women obtain abortions after the twelfth week
and only 1.5% of women obtain abortions after twenty weeks,128 a surge in new
kinds of restrictions has occurred since 2010 when Nebraska passed an abortion
ban at twenty weeks on the basis of the ability of the fetus to feel pain at this point
in gestation.129 The law mirrored model legislation crafted by the National Right to
Life Committee.130 As of 2015, nineteen states had enacted pre-viability abortion
bans; nine of these states have done so on the premise that the fetus has developed
the necessary biological structures to experience pain.131 Citing these neurological
pathways and the use of fetal sedation procedures for later-term abortions,
legislators in these nine states claim fetal pain as the medical and scientific basis
for the bills.132 Yet, even certain religious advocates who oppose abortion recognize
the unstable footing of the laws.133
Although Casey permits regulations that serve the State’s interest in
protecting potential life so long as they do not have the purpose or effect of
imposing an undue burden on women’s protected liberty interest in obtaining
abortions,134 the framework of Roe is still good law that forbids any complete bans
on abortions pre-viability.135 Since viability is a characteristic that varies depending
on a number of factors (including sex and birth weight),136 and most measures
mes.com/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/the-outrageous-shackling-of-pregnant-inmates.html; Health
Care for Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, AM. CONG.
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 3 (Nov. 2011), http://www.acog.org/-/media/CommitteeOpinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co511.pdf; Briefing Paper, Am.
Civil Liberties Union, The Shackling of Pregnant Women and Girls in U.S. Prisons, Jails, and Youth
Detention Centers (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_s
tand_alone.pdf.
128
Eric Eckholm, Several States Forbid Abortion After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/us/27abortion.html.
129
Abortion Bans at 20 Weeks: A Dangerous Restriction for Women, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. 1
(Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-bans-at-20-weeks.pdf.
130
See Pema Levy, Can the Myth of Fetal Pain Topple Roe v. Wade, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 11, 2013,
3:53 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/can-myth-fetal-pain-topple-roe-v-wade-3077.
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See State Policies in Brief: State Policies on Later Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://guttma
cher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2015).
132
A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court: Fetal Pain Laws, PEW RES. CTR
(Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-key-abortion-rulings-of-the-ussupreme-court/#fetal.
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See Katelyn Beaty, Editorial, The Problem with the Fetal Pain Abortion Bans, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/january-february/problem-withfetal-pain-abortion-bans.html.
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POST (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-flawed-basis-behind-fetal-painabortion-laws/2012/08/01/gJQAS0w8PX_story.html.
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indicate (and medical experts assert) that the likelihood of viability before twentyfour weeks is significantly diminished, the bans are likely unconstitutional without
a valid scientific basis that demonstrates the necessity of the regulation in
protecting the health of the woman or fetus.137
Comprehensive studies and an exhaustive review of such studies published
in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 2005 established that fetuses
do not feel pain at twenty weeks.138 Although the neural circuitry required for
experiencing pain begins to develop at around twenty-three weeks of gestation,
“the pathways are not functional and cannot transmit the noxious stimuli to the
brain before 29 or 30 weeks.”139 The science has not changed in the past decade.140
Experts explain that the fetus is suspended in a continuous sleep/coma-like
unconscious sedation through the end of the second trimester.141 Furthermore,
although supporters of these bans point to automatic, reflexive responses of
fetuses that occur in reaction to an amniocentesis needle or other stimulation,
these reflexes are not indicators of pain or of a conscious experience of pain.142 The
use of anesthesia by providers of second-trimester abortions serves the purpose of
sedating the fetus so that it moves less, with an additional effect of mitigating any

Abortion Bans, SCI. PROGRESS (May 23, 2013), http://scienceprogress.org/2013/05/fetal-anomaliesundue-burdens-and-20-week-abortion-bans/.
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Fetal Homicide Laws, 25 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 41 (2014); Countering Misinformation: A
Discussion
of
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ANSIRH,
http://ansirh.org/research/late-abortion/counteringmisinformation/viability.
php [https://web.archive.org/web/20150916182333/http://www.ansirh.org/research/late-abortion/co
untering-misinformation/viability.php].
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Susan J. Lee, Henry J. Peter Ralston, Eleanor A. Drey, John Colin. Partridge, & Mark A.
Rosen, Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 947
(2005).
139
Corrigan, supra note 70.
140
Liz Halloran & Julie Rovner, High Court’s Pass on ‘Fetal Pain’ Abortion Case Unlikely to Cool
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NPR
(Jan.
13,
2014,
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http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/01/13/262178284/h
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(June
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painful sensory experiences that may exist.143 As a result of the scientific consensus
on the subject, these laws are opposed by the ACOG.144
Regardless of the date of publication and the scientific consensus on the
matter, proponents of these bans do not hesitate to use quotations excerpted from
researchers who study pain and fetal development to the dismay and astonishment
of those very researchers.145 Unfortunately since there are still one or two “medical
experts” who are willing to testify before legislatures and courts,146 an illusion of
scientific uncertainty could be interpreted to exist.147
Federal judges have struck down these fetal pain abortion bans in Idaho148
and Arizona;149 similarly, a Georgia state court enjoined the State from enforcing
such a ban.150 A district court judge in Idaho similarly struck down such a
provision, determining that it constituted a substantial obstacle and imposed an
undue burden on women seeking abortions.151 A Ninth Circuit panel of judges
permanently struck down the Arizona law on the grounds that any pre-viability
bans were unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade.152 None of the three opinions
utilized rational basis review to strike down the law in question, declining the
opportunity to hold that the law had no real effect on the interest and purpose of
the legislation as a result of the medical claims being false and unsubstantiated.
143
Pam Belluck, Complex Science at Issue in Politics of Fetal Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/health/complex-science-at-issue-in-politics-of-fetal-pain.html;
Cohen, supra note 133.
144
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ach/20120618DCAborStmnt.pdf.
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AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/09/17/2633271/scientists-fetal-pain/; Jill Filipovic, No,
Science Doesn’t Back 20-Week ‘Fetal Pain’ Abortion Bans, TPM (Sept. 20, 2013, 1:26 PM),
http://talkingpoints
memo.com/cafe/science-doesn-t-back-fetal-pain-justification-for-20-week-abortion-bans.
146
Jodi Jacobson, Trent Franks, Abortion Bans, and the Fetal Pain Lie, RH REALITY CHECK (June
13, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/06/13/trent-franks-abortion-bans-and-thefetal-pain-lie/.
147
Coutts & Resnick, supra note 66.
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McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013), aff’d sub nom. McCormack
v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Lathrop v. Deal, No. 2012-cv-224423 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2012) (order granting
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The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to review the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling, leaving decisions in the hands of the federal courts, for now.153
Unfortunately, some states will not even face challenges to these laws since those
states do not have providers who conduct abortions in the second trimester, and
constitutional litigation requires legal standing and a claim of harm to the filing
party.154 Supporters of these bans, however, continue to propose legislation
modeled after the Pain-Capable Unborn Children Act drafted by the NRLC and
passed by the United States House of Representatives.155 Anti-choice proponents of
these measures base their hopes on the precedent set by Gonzales v. Carhart, in
which the Supreme Court upheld a federal abortion ban156 just years after striking
a similar state provision down157 and after federal courts had acted similarly to
strike down the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 in the years between.158 A
Supreme Court ruling upholding fetal pain abortion bans would overrule the
framework set up in Roe.
These bills are not only problematic because they are based on junk science
but also because eighteen- to twenty-week gestational age is the time period when
a range of fetal abnormalities can be detected for the first time.159 Additional
burdensome restrictions impeding speedy access to abortion services and
imposing excessive stress and costs could create a situation where women find
themselves in a race against the clock to obtain an abortion before running into a
valid constitutional ban beginning at twenty-four weeks or soon thereafter. These
laws are troublesome for additional reasons.160 They impact women who wish to

153
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http://
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carry their children to term but experience complications in pregnancy,161 and they
normalize false ideas and perpetuate misinformation. Doctors have reported
having conversations with patients that were extremely uncommon a decade ago
and attribute this change to increased misinformation among laypersons.162
Furthermore, the framing of abortion procedures carried out after the twentyweek mark primarily as an issue of fetal pain both changes the nature of the
conversation away from women’s liberty interests and also likely benefits the antichoice messaging tactics. These arguments typically achieve greater success in
gaining public support for restrictions on abortions, where the discussion revolves
around fetuses instead of embryos.163
iv.
Informed Consent Laws
The concept of informed consent emerged in twentieth century tort law164
and was rooted in the American principle of enabling and promoting decisional
autonomy.165 The purpose of informed consent in the medical context is for health
care providers to disclose—amongst other things—“the substantial risks and
hazards inherent in the proposed…procedures.”166 Though certain exceptions to
informed consent exist, including patient waiver and emergency treatment,167 an
expectation of informed consent is the standard imposed by the law.168 In modern
law, most states have protected this expectation statutorily, imposing civil liability
for damages on doctors who fail to adhere to legal requirements and professional
standards.169 Such statutes apply evenly to health care practitioners of any
specialty, requiring them to disclose to the patient any risks associated with
specific treatment options.170 Moreover, gross neglect in meeting these standards

161
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Kathy Lohr, Reframing the Abortion Debate: Focus on Fetus, NPR (June 30, 2010, 4:34 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128212951; Katie McDonough, Fetal Pain is
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of the profession can lead to other penalties imposed by medical boards and
associations, including being stripped of one’s medical license.171
Nevertheless, as with other instances of abortion exceptionalism, additional
informed consent laws specific to reproductive health care have proliferated.172
Appallingly, these laws mandate that doctors provide not the risks that the
medical profession believes to be associated with abortion procedures but instead
state-sanctioned counseling that includes: 1) inaccurate and misleading
information that is scientifically unsubstantiated; 2) irrelevant material that is
graphic in nature; and 3) alternative options for treatment other than those that
the patient is seeking.
Abortion-specific informed consent laws are some of the most popular and
problematic restrictions limiting women’s ability to access abortion services.
Although such restrictions have been around since the 1980s,173 the enactment of
these provisions increased dramatically after the decisions handed down in Casey
and Gonzales, respectively, upheld a mandatory counseling requirement and
implied both: 1) that any perception (misconstrued, overstated, or otherwise) of
scientific uncertainty regarding the safety of procedures warranted paternalistic
government oversight in the name of public health; and 2) that the weight of
decisions to abort would or could have lasting effects on the psychological health
of mothers.
Notably, in the Casey decision overruling Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists,174 Justice O’Connor’s language in the majority
opinion required that all informed consent disclosures be “truthful and not
misleading.”175 Fifteen years later, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales upheld
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, while conceding that the Court could “find no
reliable data to measure the phenomenon” that women would come to regret the
procedure176 and reasoning that Casey reaffirmed that “[t]he government may use
its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life
within the woman. A central premise of the opinion was that the Court’s
precedents after Roe had ‘undervalue[d] the State’s interest in potential life.’”177
These rulings emboldened state legislatures to pass abortion-specific
informed consent laws, many under the title of Women’s Right to Know Act,178

171
GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 362 (2016).
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mandating disclosure of specific, State-determined information that the State
deemed germane to the procedure. Often, states also impose a mandatory waiting
period179 for the woman to consider the information she receives in mandatory
counseling, indicating, without any empirical basis to support the presumption,180
that the woman needs this additional time to consider this information thoroughly
in order to determine her next steps.181
A fact sheet published by the Guttmacher Institute reported that, as of
January 2016, “[thirty-eight] states require that women receive counseling before
an abortion is performed” and “[twenty-seven] of these states detail the
information a woman must be given.”182 This same report detailed the specific
requirements imposed by each state.183 Remarkably, in drafting, proposing, and
enacting this legislation, the states failed to enlist or depend on the testimony of
medical practitioners and experts.184 In her analysis of the flawed fact-finding
process employed by state legislatures surrounding reproductive health legislation,
Caitlin Borgmann analyzed the South Dakota Task Force.185 Her research
demonstrated that the task force failed to seek out and take into account the
opinions and testimony of medical experts and drew conclusions about the effect
of abortions on mental health care based on the testimony of an unrepresentative
sample size of women.186 Borgmann notes that even the pro-life committeewoman
who chaired the Task Force voted against its ultimate recommendations.187
There are various types of informed consent provisions that are based on
junk science. Disconcertingly, these laws mandate that doctors counsel patients
about risks that do not exist. These provisions188 require doctors to advise women
MOTHERHOOD, AND MENTAL HEALTH: MEDICALIZING REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT
BRITAIN 130 (2003).
179
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180
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consent).
182
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Id. at 43.
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of four inaccuracies: 1) a link between abortion and breast cancer;189 2) a link
between abortion and depression or decreased quality of mental health
(sometimes referred to as “post-abortion syndrome”);190 3) a link between abortion
and subsequent infertility;191 and 4) the likelihood of fetal pain.192 The purported
link between abortion and breast cancer has been widely discredited,193 as has the
causal relationship between abortion and depression (studies suggest that the best
indicator of mental health post-abortion is the mental health of the woman before
the procedure).194 There are no data that demonstrate a link between firsttrimester abortions and subsequent fertility problems.195 Although some evidence
indicates that later-term abortions result in slightly decreased fertility,196 advances
in the safety of second- and third-trimester abortion procedures have drastically
decreased this effect.197 Counseling regarding fetal pain is also not grounded in any
legitimate medical knowledge, as described and discussed in the previous
section.198 These various counseling requirements are at best misleading and at
worst untruthful and should therefore fail under the standard established in Casey.
The other two forms of abortion-specific informed consent provisions are
those that are graphic199 and irrelevant in nature—requiring mandatory
ultrasounds and the description of the gestational age and fetal development of
the fetus—and those that require delivery of additional information relaying the
opinions of the State200 and the existence of alternative options201 that, through
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funding, facilitate birth of the fetus and, later, child and health care.202 Although
these provisions are not based on junk science, an understanding of the purpose of
informed consent illustrates why use of these laws and “informational
manipulation”203 are inappropriate ways to convey the State’s respect for life.204
Leading medical organizations oppose these abortion-specific informed
consent provisions, asserting that they are often factually inaccurate or irrelevant
and interfere with doctors’ abilities to use medical discretion.205 These restrictions
also drive up the costs for women in two ways: 1) requiring unnecessary
ultrasounds and increasing the time doctors must spend with patients, adding
additional operating expenses;206 and 2) imposing mandatory delays or
requirements that mandate counseling at non abortion-providing facilities
requiring women to take additional time off work and to incur the costs associated
with public or private transportation for additional trips to obtain an abortion.207
The informed consent regulations also perpetuate misinformation among women
and voters.208
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http://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Government-Relations-and-Outreach/20140715S1696T
estimony.pdf.
206
Forced-Ultrasound Legislation is an Egregious Intrusion into Medical Care, NARAL PROCHOICE AM. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortionmandatory-ultrasound.pdf.
207
Boonstra & Nash, supra note 86; see also Vandewalker, supra note 140, at 32–33.
208
See Policy Statements, ASS’N REPROD. HEALTH PROF., http://www.arhp.org/aboutus/position-statements (last updated June 30, 2012).
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IMPLICATIONS FOR EVOLVING HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGIES AND
CAPABILITIES
“[L]aw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and . . . when they fail
in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow
209
of social progress.” – Martin Luther King, Jr.

There are many frightening implications of state and federal legislatures’
poor understanding and unscrupulous use of science for recent and potential
advancements in various areas related to women’s reproductive health.210 Most
evident and most looming is the threat of increased restrictions that have no
rational basis in protecting women’s or fetal health, let alone the sufficient
tailoring required to meet an important “liberty” or “privacy” interest protected by
the Constitution, and that serve only to further hamper access to reproductive
health services.
Advancements in assisted reproductive technologies,211 genetic and
developmental testing in utero, and embryological and stem cell research
abound.212 Increased connectivity and the ability to use robotic surgical
instruments that can be operated from a distance are reshaping the way that
public health innovators are thinking about increasing access to health care in
rural areas.213 Telemedicine214 in this and other forms is becoming a reality and will
likely soon be the source of numerous legislative regulations and restrictions.215
Furthermore, developments in contraceptive health care, such as automatic

209
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), reprinted in 26 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 835, 842 (1993).
210
See Hutton Brown, Miriam Dent, L. Mark Dyer, Cherie Fuzzell, Anita Gifford, Sam Griffin,
A.G. Kasselberg, Jayne Workman, & Melina L. Cooper, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding
Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597 (1986).
211
See Resolve’s Policy on “Personhood” Legislation, RESOLVE, http://resolve.org/about/personh
ood-legislation.html (last updated Apr. 2012).
212
John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early
Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327 (2011).
213
See, e.g., Heather Slawson, Note, Telemedicine: The Affordable Care Act’s Forgotten Frontier
of Rural Health Care, 19 HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193 (2015).
214
Telemedicine is defined as “the use of electronic communication and information
technologies to provide or support clinical care at a distance with the goal of improving a patient’s
health.” Id. at 194–198; see also What is Telemedicine?, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N,
http://americantelem
ed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine#.VKBFpADB (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
215
See generally Daniel J. Gilman, Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some Competitive
Issues Raised by the Prospect of Practicing Globally while Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 87 (2011) (explaining the issues inherent to telemedicine law that make it ripe for legislative
action and evaluating these issues); B. Jesse Hill, Legislative Restrictions on Abortion, 14 AMA J.
ETHICS 133 (2012) (explaining some of the implications of legislative restrictions on telemedicine,
including how it may impact abortion services).
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delivery and medicinal abortion216 that pose no danger to women’s health, are
expanding legal questions of insurance coverage, public funding, and prescription
or over-the-counter drug availability.
Imagine, first, for instance, the existence of an automated-delivery
hormonal IUD device that can sense the presence of sperm or female hormones
produced during sex and releases a medicine that targets sperm and eggs before
fertilization can occur. Second, imagine a rural town with only one physician’s
assistant (PA), but the PA is part of a network of rural health care providers who
are part of a medical partnership consisting of licensed physicians who are trained
abortion providers. The PA should be able to examine the female patient, share her
electronic medical records with her supervising physician, and obtain a
prescription for Mifeprostone for the patient without requiring the physician to
ever be present or have contact with the patient. Indulge once more and imagine a
third scenario in which a hypothetical third and fourth pregnant woman hoping to
carry their babies to term are seeking prenatal health services. This third woman
finds out, due to advancements in genomic and diseasome217 mapping, that her
fetus has developed significant impairments late-term that will create pain and
misery for the future child and his or her family in addition to levying extensive
costs associated with providing care for such a child or person. The fourth
pregnant woman is a recovering addict who is enrolled in a new addiction
treatment program that utilizes supervised doses of a controlled drug to manage
withdrawal and monitor the health of the mother and the fetus. The hypotheticals
presented by the third and fourth women described above are already realities; the
others soon could be.
Although these technological developments should be regarded as
promising for expanding access to and improving the quality of reproductive and
prenatal health care, the trend in regulating the sphere of women’s reproductive
health with excessive and exceptional restrictions that do not rationally relate to
any substantiated medical interest is cause for concern. Advancements in
telemedicine that could reliably bring higher-quality health care to rural areas may
be hampered merely because those advancements serve the specific area of
reproductive health.

216
See generally, Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion Restrictions Burden Women and
Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early Abortion, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter
2013, at 18 (explaining the procedures involved with a medical abortion).
217
The term “diseasome” refers to the study of the intersection between disease and genetics.
See generally Kwang-Il Goh & In-Geol Choi, Exploring the Human Diseasome: the Human Disease
Network,
11
BRIEFINGS
IN
FUNCTIONAL
GENOMICS
533
(2012),
http://bfg.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/6
/533 (describing the network of human genes and their interaction with various proteins as the
“diseasome”).
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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
“[B]etween a balanced republic and a democracy, the difference is like that
218
between order and chaos.” – Chief Justice John Marshall

Parts I through III have established the troubling trend of legislatures’
misuse of science to craft laws limiting women’s access to reproductive health
services, outlined the ways in which these restrictions impact women and health
care providers, and recognized the disturbing implications of permitting the
propagation of such legislation. This Part will propose solutions to this emerging
and worsening trend.
A.

Recommended Level of Deference in Court’s Treatment of Legislative FactFinding
Noting the incoherent standard by which federal courts decide to defer to
legislative fact-finding, several legal scholars have taken up the issue219—
differentiating between the nature of various types of facts,220 assessing relevant
political principles and constitutional doctrines,221 and evaluating the respective
abilities of government branches to find facts222 —in order to propose workable
and rights-protecting theories of deference. Several of these scholars have
examined legislative fact-finding and subsequent treatment of these facts by the
courts in the context of laws restricting access to abortion.
218
JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 467 (Robert Faulkner & Paul Carrese
eds., spec. ed. for schools, Liberty Fund, Inc. 2000) (1838).
219
See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FACTS 129–33 (2008).
220
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45–51 (1977); William D. Araiza,
Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, Part I.B (2013); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law,
25 CONST. COMMENT. 69 (2008).
221
See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision-making, 98
IOWA L. REV. 465, 465 (2013) (“[C]ourts should examine the actual behavior and processes of the
relevant governmental institution before deciding whether deference is appropriate.”); Eric Berger,
In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional
Decision-making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that the varying degree of deference among
courts in context of the Eighth Amendment leads to careless and opaque decision-making);
Borgmann, supra note 2 (addressing the Supreme Court’s declining standard of review in major
abortion cases); David L. Faigman, Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, & Kathryn M. Davis, Amicus Brief of
Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al. in the Case of
Gonzales v. Carhart, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69 (2006) (urging the Supreme Court to find facts
independently of legislatures in determining fundamental rights); Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in
Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (2013) (suggesting the abandonment of the
tiered approach to scrutiny in order to avoid the strategic subversion of fundamental rights by
legislatures).
222
Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1172–77 (2007) (book review).

51

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

Vol. 4, Issue 1

Notable among these analyses is the work of Caitlin Borgmann, who
explains,
Justice and truth are pillars of the good society, and the courts play a vital role in
ensuring both. The courts' primary responsibility is for the norms of justice, but
implementing justice depends upon factual truth. Laws founded upon untruths
subvert justice. Thus, when courts address laws that implicate individual rights
like the right to abortion, they must ensure that these laws are based on a sound
223
factual foundation.

Borgmann argues that the Supreme Court only began applying a new standard of
giving a great degree of deference to legislative fact-finding in the second Carhart
case, Gonzales v. Carhart,224 and that this deference departed from the Court’s
typical skepticism toward provisions challenged on grounds involving individual
rights, which ordinarily receive heightened scrutiny.225
Borgmann proposes a theory of deference in which the courts conduct
“selective independent judicial review of social facts . . . of all legislation that
curtails important individual rights protected by the federal Constitution.”226
Similarly, Daniel Faigman calls for a theory of deference to facts that mirrors the
skepticism associated with presumptions of constitutionality in tiers of review.227
Closer to Borgmann’s proposal is William Araiza’s conclusion that courts should
defer in review of rights-enhancing legislation and conduct independent factfinding when assessing constitutional challenges to rights-limiting legislation.228
Fact-finding by the legislature plays an important role in determining
whether there is an issue that creates a policy interest for the State and in
determining what sort of restrictions would work best to achieve the legislature’s
goals. If courts merely accept the stated interest as having a valid basis in social
fact and determine sufficiency of tailoring by whether a regulation unnecessarily
restricts unobjectionable activities and not by whether the proposed fix is sensibly
related to the purported goal, then they are not taking any account of the
legislative fact-finding process.229
Two prominent justifications exist for courts’ deference to legislative factfinding. The first justification is the judiciary’s respect for the legislating power
223
Borgmann, supra note 2, at 15.
224
Id. at 17; 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
225
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND.
L.J. 1, 50 (2009).
226
Id. at 3.
227
See FAIGMAN, supra note 218.
228
See Araiza, supra note 219.
229
See Lauren Paulk, What is an “Undue Burden?” The Casey Standard as Applied to Informed
Consent Provisions, 20 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 103–05 (2013) (explaining the problematic judicial
treatment of the Undue Burden standard in Lakey).
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ascribed to Congress by the Constitution and the separation of powers.230 The
second basis is that the legislature has an inherently superior ability to find facts as
a result of its ability to convene committee hearings, call for testimony, and
contribute substantial amounts of time to these processes.231 The work of these
judicial-deference scholars rebuts these presumptions, acknowledging,
respectively, the courts’ role as a counter-majoritarian check on democracy and
the pressures that reelection, executive influence, and partisan politics have on the
cognitive judgments of legislators and on legislative committees.232 Unlike elected
legislators, federal judges are appointed to life terms and insulated from the
political pressures of party affiliation and accountability to voters, and are
therefore less likely to be biased in fact-finding processes.233
Borgmann describes the particular superiority of ability that federal trial
courts possess in amassing an unbiased and legitimate factual record, noting that
the adversarial process brings all relevant facts to light, that the Federal Rules of
Evidence prevent inflammatory and irrelevant hearsay from being considered, and
that the “reactive nature of the trial courts frees them from a slavish devotion to a
pre-set political agenda” in that the role of trial courts is “not to establish or revisit
precedent, but to apply it.”234 Furthermore, the trial process has various features
“designed to optimize fairness,” including the absence of bias in the number of
witnesses that can be called and the court’s ability to seek information and expert
opinion outside of those brought before it.235 Additionally, when trial courts collect
and review evidence, the same person who considers all of the information is the
one making the decision. In legislatures, on the other hand, the committees that
collect and distribute information cannot be sure whether elected officials will
thoroughly read and examine it.236
Trial courts are already tasked with finding historical and adjudicative facts.
In various circumstances, though, social facts are often dispositive in the
evaluation of a statute’s constitutionality. These instances include the existence of
a harm meriting legislative intervention; the rationality of the proposed policy to
achieve the legislature’s purported goal; and the law’s over-inclusion of
unobjectionable, unrelated, or constitutionally-protected behaviors.

230
Borgmann, supra note 224, at 16–18.
231
Id. at 18–21.
232
Id. at 35–46; see also Jessica Mason Pieklo, Why We May See Different Outcomes in the
Wisconsin and Alabama TRAP Trials, RH REALITY CHECK (June 11, 2014, 10:23 AM),
http://rhrealitychec
k.org/article/2014/06/11/may-see-different-outcomes-wisconsin-alabama-trap-trials/ (citing Judge
Posner’s 7th circuit opinion upholding federal trial court’s decision to strike down Wisconsin TRAP
laws in which he makes the case for court-appointed medical experts).
233
See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 224, at 6 n.28, 35–46.
234
Id. at 41.
235
Id. at 43–44.
236
Id. at 42–43.
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Recognizing both the frequency with which state restrictions are challenged
in and enjoined by federal courts and the various examples of state legislatures’
inadequacies at evaluating social facts of a scientific nature,237 federal trial courts
should engage in independent fact-finding when evaluating the constitutionality
of laws that are rights-restricting, and federal appellate courts should consider and
afford appropriate deference to the factual record amassed by the trial courts
rather than to the one created by the legislature. Such a policy would promote two
ends. First, it would ensure that restrictions passed in the name of public health
have legitimate medical bases, thereby preventing bad science from being
enshrined in the law by virtue of stare decisis.238 Second, it would set a standard of
fact-finding that enables a clearer application of the undue burden standard by
forcing courts to consider the purpose of the legislation and the contributing social
factors that affect whether women are unduly burdened by reproductive health
restrictions (i.e. whether the burden imposed is sufficiently counterbalanced by a
legitimate, constitutional furtherance of State interests). Both of these effects of
adhering to this proposed model of deference would appropriately fit the language
of Casey that required any analysis of restrictions on abortion “to give some real
substance to the woman’s liberty.”239
B.

Right to Medical Decision Making
Apart from changing the standard of deference given to the legislative factfinding process, there are other potential avenues for addressing the problem of
legislatures misusing science to regulate women’s ability to access adequate
reproductive health care. The first and most protective option would be for courts
to recognize implicit rights to (or for states to enshrine within their constitutions
an explicit right to) medical decision-making. Such a right would be attractive to
individuals across the political spectrum (recall “death panels”), would be based on
the societal interests of autonomy240 and the right to contract, and could be
reasonably based on any constitutional provision articulating liberty, selfdetermination, or privacy.241 This right would guarantee non-interference with
health care beyond regulations imposed for malpractice, informed consent, and by
national medical boards, 242 and would be in accordance with the UN Universal
237
See supra Part II.
238
Borgmann, supra note 2, at 55.
239
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
240
See generally ERIN NELSON, LAW, POLICY, AND REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY 11–31 (2013)
(explaining the importance of autonomy politically, philosophically, and historically).
241
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of
Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 305–307 (2010).
242
Cf. Hill, supra note 17, at 502 (arguing that abortions should be treated like any other
medical procedure and that the right to make medical decisions should be a negative right instead
of a positive right).
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Declaration of Human Rights that provides a similar right and to which this
country is a signatory.243
C.

Advocacy and Engagement of Media and the Populace
Thus far, the recommended solutions for this problem of legislatures’
misuse of science have focused on the first of two checks on the legislature: the
court’s power of judicial review. Educating the citizens who elect the legislature
provides a second, democratic check. Research in political economics and
sociology demonstrates that indicators of effectiveness sway voters in election
determinations.244 Therefore, increased attention by the media to this troubling
trend and more effective messaging by advocacy organizations can play a role in
preventing harmful legislation from going into effect245 and holding legislators
accountable.
One emerging campaign trying to do just this is the increasing use of the
hashtag #sciencenotstigma on Twitter and other social networks to address misuse
of science in various areas of the law, but specifically to challenge the “crack
babies” myth and the criminalization of pregnant women who use drugs or seek
rehabilitative services.246 This campaign, started by National Advocates for
Pregnant Women, has taken off on social media and been used to promote various
ends. Other reproductive health organizations have established projects with
similar goals: 1) the “False Witness” reports by RH Reality Check247 document
instances of misuse of science by politicians and advocates by profiling individuals
who testify on the validity of unsubstantiated medical claims in support of antichoice legislation; and 2) the “1 in 3” Let’s Talk About Abortion Campaign
facilitates conversations about abortion in order to destigmatize the procedure by
sharing the stories of everyday women, thereby educating the public with statistics

243
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
244
E.g., Gerard Padró i Miquel & James M. Snyder, Jr., Legislative Effectiveness and Legislative
Careers, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 347, 372 (2006) (“[S]uperior effectiveness yields electoral benefits for
legislators in the form of higher reelection rates and higher probabilities of being unchallenged.”);
see also Shigeo Hirano & James M. Snyder Jr., Primary Elections and the Quality of Elected Officials,
9 Q.J. POL. SCI. 473 (2014).
245
For a good example of this type of advocacy, see Loren Siegel, Reproductive Justice: A
Communications Overview, OPPORTUNITY AGENDA (Sept. 10, 2010), http://opportunityagenda.org/file
s/field_file/2010.09.10ReproductiveJustice-CommunicationsOverview.pdf.
246
E.g., The New Moral Panic Over Drug-Dependent Babies, NAT’L ADVOC. FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN
(June
24,
2014),
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/featured/the_new_moral_panic_over_drug
dependent_babies.php.
247
False Witnesses, RH REALITY CHECK, http://rhrealitycheck.org/false-witnesses/ (last visited
Oct. 5, 2015).
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demonstrating the widespread use of the procedure and providing a national
network of support for women.248
The pro-choice movement’s failure to effectively engage the public and to
engage the media in recent decades is a facet of this problem that cannot be
ignored. A “we won” mentality fostered apathy among supporters of abortion
rights for decades and allowed creeping regulations to dismantle these rights and
women’s access to health care. Moreover, for decades the reproductive rights
movement failed to encompass the intersectional concerns of all women and has
permitted privilege to corrupt the social movement. Increased attempts to form
and maintain intersectional alliances will embolden the effort to realize the
protection of the rights of those of all socioeconomic classes, those in prison, and
those of various backgrounds.249 This is the essence of a true reproductive justice
framework.250
D.

Other
Other options for solutions include building on cases that apply a proper,
elevated undue burden standard,251 encouraging the passage of legislation that
leads to the adoption of merit selection systems for state judicial appointments,252
and the passage of the Women’s Health Protection Act by the US Congress.253
248
Advocates for Youth, 1 in 3 Campaign, http://www.1in3campaign.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 5,
2015).
249
See Moving in a New Direction: A Proactive State Policy Resource for Promoting
Reproductive Health, Rights, and Justice, CTR. FOR REPRODUC. RTS. (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://reproductiverights.org/sit
es/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/US-PAPS-Compendium-final-SM.pdf.
250
Loretta Ross, What is Reproductive Justice, PRO-CHOICE EDUC. PROJECT,
http://www.protectc
hoice.org/section.php?id=28 (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
251
See Emma Freeman, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in Undue
Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, Part III (2013); Paulk, supra note 228, at 109; Caitlin
E. Borgmann, In Abortion Litigation it’s the Facts that Matter, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 149 (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/02/in-abortion-litigation-its-the-facts-that-matter/.
252
See generally Dawn Johnsen, State Court Protection of Reproductive Rights: The Past, the
Perils, and the Promise, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41, 45–46 (explaining that anti-abortion activists
have been pushing for direct elections of state judges instead of merit selection systems); Alicia
Bannon, Eric Velasco, Linda Casey, & Lianna Reagan, The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2011–12:
How New Waves of Special Interest Spending Raised the Stakes for Fair Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST.
27–37
(Oct.
2013),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/New%20Politics%
20of%20Judicial%20Elections%202012.pdf (describing merit selection systems and the problems
states’ are having with implementing such systems effectively); Joanna Shepherd & Michael S.
Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television Advertising, and State Supreme Court Justices’
Decisions in Criminal Cases, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (2014), http://skewedjustice.org/ (tracing the money
that has flooded into state judicial elections in the wake of the Citizens United decision).
253
E.g., Women’s Health Protection Act of 2013, S. 1696, 113th Cong. (2013).
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CONCLUSION
“Truth never lost ground by enquiry.” – William Penn

254

This Note has examined the misuse of junk science by state legislators in
regulating women’s reproductive health. Documenting several different forms that
such provisions take—including TRAP laws, the criminalization of substance
abuse by pregnant women, fetal pain abortion bans, and informed consent laws—
and the opposition to such laws by leading medical organizations, along with their
impact on women and physicians, this Note has also analyzed the developments in
federal legal doctrine that shaped the current state of the law and both permitted
and prompted the passage of anti-choice legislation. In order to illustrate further
the troubling nature of this legislative trend, this paper also briefly analyzed the
potential implications of permitting scientifically-challenged legislators to
continue to regulate future medical technologies, treatment methodologies, and
pharmaceutical developments.
This worsening trend diminishes access to reproductive health care, drives
up costs of abortion services, and impinges on the medical discretion of physicians
and the physician-patient relationship. With hundreds of pieces of state legislation
passed in the last few years alone, it is unlikely that either the poor maternal and
infant health figures or the low quality of prenatal care documented by the WHO
and the National Institutes of Health will improve.255
Noting that the source of this problem is the oversight and misuse of
science in the legislative fact-finding process and courts’ subsequent deference to
this process when laws are challenged, this Note primarily recommends that
courts decrease their deference to legislative fact-finding in rights-limiting
legislation, in accordance with the courts’ position as a fact-finder and countermajoritarian check on democracy, along with a variety of other potential solutions.
Other recommendations include finding that state and federal constitutions
implicitly protect a right to medical decision-making as an aspect of due process
liberty, increasing the accuracy of reporting on failures in legislative competence,
and implementing more effective messaging about the increasing efforts to restrict
women’s rights to reproductive health care of their choice. Each of these measures
will contribute to protecting the integrity of science and justice, while assuring
women’s access to necessary and constitutionally-protected medical care.
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WILLIAM PENN, SOME FRUITS OF SOLITUDE 141 (Headley Bros. 1905) (1682).
255
See Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, New Report Debunks Politicians’ Disingenuous
Claims about Protecting Women’s Health and Safety in Passing Abortion Restrictions (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/new-report-debunks-politicians-claims-about-protect
ing-womens-health-safety-with-abortion-restrictions.
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